LEA

Lear Corporation

$108.71

+0.13%
Nov 13, 2026
Bobby Quantitative Model
Lear Corporation is the world's largest automotive seating supplier, operating through two segments — Seating (roughly 74% of sales) and E-Systems, which produces wire harnesses, battery connection systems, and electrical distribution components for global OEMs. With approximately 26% just-in-time seating market share and management targeting 29% through conquest wins, Lear is a scale-driven, vertically integrated tier-one supplier rather than a disruptor, though its E-Systems exposure gives it a foothold in vehicle electrification and content-per-vehicle growth. The current investor debate centers on whether Lear can defend margins against a soft global production backdrop and tariff/regional-mix pressure, with the stock having de-rated sharply after a July 2026 earnings-driven selloff and a subsequent slide to fresh lows. A customer concentration risk — GM at roughly 22% of revenue and GM plus Ford near one-third — combined with a heavily unionized workforce (about 46% of 164,300 employees) keeps the narrative anchored to cyclical auto production and cost discipline rather than secular growth.

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BobbyInvestment Opinion: Should I buy LEA Today?

Rating: Hold. Lear is a genuinely cheap stock — 6.64x EV/EBITDA, 0.26x sales, 5.60x price-to-cash-flow and roughly an 11.5% FCF yield on $700.8 million of TTM free cash flow against a ~$6.09 billion market cap — but cheapness alone is not a thesis when gross margin has fallen for three straight quarters (7.59% to 7.07% to 6.62%) and Q3 EBITDA collapsed to $212.6 million from $397.2 million in Q2. The neutral anchor is the sell-side: all five covering analysts sit at Neutral/Equal Weight/Sector Perform/In Line, JP Morgan downgraded from Overweight to Neutral on 2026-09-15, and the dataset contains no published price targets, so there is no consensus target to compute upside from.

Supporting evidence is a tug-of-war between cash return and earnings erosion. On the positive side, revenue of $5.773 billion in Q3 2026 grew 1.64% year-over-year, the five-analyst revenue range of $27.02-$27.95 billion spans only ~3.5% and the EPS range of $27.73-$28.98 spans ~4.5%, the 2.70% dividend is covered at a 37.7% payout ratio, and share count fell from 53.7 million (Q2 2025) to 49.9 million (Q3 2026) — a ~7% reduction that mechanically lifts EPS. On the negative side, net margin is just 2.37%, operating margin 3.41%, ROE 8.68%, and the stock trades at the literal bottom of its 52-week range ($110.28 of a $110.28-$148.68 band) with -20.51% six-month relative strength versus the S&P 500; the 13.94x trailing PE is mid-range versus its own 7.68x-17.80x history, so the multiple is not the cushion — the cash flow is.

Three risks could invalidate the Hold: a further leg down in gross margin toward 6% (which would validate the earnings-erosion thesis and likely break the stock below $110), a GM platform cut given GM is ~22% of revenue and GM plus Ford about one-third, and a production rollover that turns the volatile quarterly FCF pattern (from -$26.5 million in Q1 to $287.8 million in Q2 to $158.4 million in Q3) sustainably negative. This Hold would upgrade to Buy if Q4 gross margin stabilizes at or above 6.6% and the stock reclaims the $125-$130 shelf, and would downgrade to Sell if gross margin prints below 6% or free cash flow turns negative for consecutive quarters. Verdict: undervalued on cash flow and sales (0.26x PS versus 0.84x-1.08x through 2025 and 1.36x-1.64x in 2022-2023), but only fairly valued on earnings — a value stock with a broken trend, not a mispriced compounder.

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LEA 12-Month Price Forecast

Lear is a classic deep-value-versus-deterioration debate, and the evidence currently splits roughly evenly: the cash-flow math (6.64x EV/EBITDA, ~11.5% FCF yield, 2.70% covered dividend, ~7% share-count reduction) is compelling, but the operating trend (three consecutive quarters of gross-margin compression, a 46% sequential EBITDA drop, and a stock pinned at its 52-week low with -20.51% relative strength) argues the market is discounting real earnings erosion rather than mispricing a quality franchise. The tightly clustered analyst estimates (EPS $27.73-$28.98, revenue $27.02-$27.95 billion) suggest the near-term earnings base is understood, but with all five analysts at Neutral and no published targets, there is no visible upward-revision catalyst. I would upgrade to bullish on a Q4 gross-margin print at or above 6.6% combined with a reclaim of the $125-$130 shelf, and downgrade to bearish if gross margin breaks below 6% or free cash flow turns negative for consecutive quarters. Until one of those resolves, the risk/reward is balanced rather than asymmetric, which is why confidence is medium rather than high.

Historical Price
Current Price $108.71
Average Target $108.71
High Target $125.02
Low Target $92.40

Wall Street consensus

Coverage is thin, with only 5 analysts contributing estimates, and the tone is decidedly neutral: recent institutional ratings show Evercore ISI at In Line, RBC at Sector Perform, Barclays at Equal Weight, UBS and Goldman at Neutral, and Wells Fargo at Equal Weight, with the notable downgrade being JP Morgan moving from Overweight to Neutral on 2026-09-15. No firm in the provided ratings list carries an Overweight or Buy rating as of the latest dates, so the consensus leans neutral-to-cautious rather than bullish. The analyst data provides EPS estimates (average $28.41, range $27.73-$28.98) and revenue estimates (average $27.52 billion, range $27.02-$27.95 billion) but does not include explicit price targets, so an implied upside calculation to a consensus target cannot be computed from the provided data.

The estimate dispersion is relatively tight — EPS estimates span only about 4.5% ($27.73 to $28.98) and revenue estimates about 3.5% ($27.02 billion to $27.95 billion) — which signals reasonable conviction in the near-term earnings base but says nothing about multiple direction. The high end of estimates would imply modestly better production volumes or share gains, while the low end would reflect continued margin compression and softer North American builds. With only 5 analysts and a cluster of Neutral ratings, price discovery is likely less efficient and the stock more susceptible to momentum-driven moves, which is consistent with the sharp July gap lower and the current breakdown to 52-week lows; investors should treat the absence of published targets as a coverage gap rather than a signal of undervaluation.

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Bulls vs Bears: LEA Investment Factors

The bear case currently carries stronger evidence: margins have compressed for three consecutive quarters (gross margin 7.59% to 6.62%), EPS fell sequentially from $3.75 to $2.74, and the stock sits at the very bottom of its 52-week range with -20.51% six-month relative strength versus the S&P 500 and a unanimous neutral analyst stance. The bull case rests on valuation and cash return rather than momentum — 6.64x EV/EBITDA, an ~11.5% FCF yield, a 37.7% payout ratio and a 7% share-count reduction are real, but they have not been sufficient to stop the de-rating. The single most important tension is whether the margin decline is cyclical (production volumes, tariff and regional mix) or structural (pricing concessions to concentrated OEM customers); if Q4 gross margin stabilizes near 6.6%, the deep-value case becomes credible, but another leg down toward 6% would validate the market's earnings-erosion thesis and likely break the stock below $110.

Bullish

  • Deep value on cash flow metrics: At $110.28 the stock trades at 0.26x sales, 6.64x EV/EBITDA, 1.21x book and 5.60x price-to-cash-flow, with TTM free cash flow of $700.8 million against a ~$6.09 billion market cap implying an FCF yield of roughly 11.5%. That is a valuation normally reserved for businesses in structural decline, not the world's largest seating supplier with 26% JIT share.
  • Sustainable 2.7% dividend with low payout: The dividend yields 2.70% on a payout ratio of just 37.7%, funded by Q3 operating cash flow of $329.3 million against capex of $170.9 million. Lear also repurchased $175 million of stock in Q3 alone, and share count has fallen from 53.7 million (Q2 2025) to 49.9 million (Q3 2026), a ~7% reduction that mechanically supports EPS.
  • Revenue still growing, estimates tightly clustered: Q3 2026 revenue of $5.773 billion rose 1.64% year-over-year, and the five-analyst revenue range of $27.02-$27.95 billion spans only ~3.5%, with EPS estimates of $27.73-$28.98 spanning ~4.5%. Tight dispersion signals the near-term earnings base is reasonably well understood even if the multiple direction is not.
  • Seating scale and share-gain runway: Seating generated $4.326 billion, roughly 75% of Q3 revenue, on a ~26% JIT share with management targeting 29% through conquest wins. Scale leadership in a just-in-time, logistically demanding business is a genuine moat, and each point of share is meaningful against a $23 billion-plus revenue base.

Bearish

  • Margins compressing every quarter: Gross margin fell from 7.59% in Q1 2026 to 7.07% in Q2 to 6.62% in Q3, and operating margin slid from 4.46% to 3.97% to 3.41% over the same span. Q3 EBITDA of $212.6 million (3.68% margin) versus $397.2 million in Q2 shows how violently operating leverage cuts in a low-margin, high-fixed-cost business.
  • Earnings erosion already visible: Q3 2026 net income of $136.6 million (2.37% margin) fell from $192.8 million (3.10%) in Q2 and $172.3 million (2.96%) in Q1, and diluted EPS dropped to $2.74 from $3.75. The 13.94x trailing PE is not cheap if the earnings denominator keeps shrinking.
  • Severe customer concentration: GM is roughly 22% of revenue and GM plus Ford about one-third, so a single OEM's production cuts, platform cancellations or share losses can move Lear's top line materially. This concentration is a structural discount factor that peers with broader customer bases do not carry.
  • Technical breakdown at 52-week low: The stock closed at $110.28 on 2026-11-06, literally 0% of its 52-week range ($110.28-$148.68), down 21.05% over six months and 7.82% in the past month on a -3.35% high-volume session. Relative strength versus the S&P 500 is -20.51% over six months, indicating company-specific de-rating rather than mere sector drift.

LEA Technical Analysis

Lear is in a clear downtrend despite a modestly positive 1-year return of +1.72%, with the stock now at $110.28 versus a 52-week range that the price history implies runs from roughly $110.28 (the current low, set on 2026-11-06) to about $148.68 (the 2026-07-28 high). That places the shares at approximately 0% of the 52-week range — literally at the bottom — a positioning that signals persistent distribution and momentum failure rather than a value cushion, especially with a max drawdown of -25.83% over the period. The 6-month change of -21.05% and YTD decline of -7.02% confirm the intermediate trend is decisively lower, and the stock has given back essentially all of its trailing-year gains.

Short-term momentum is deteriorating rather than stabilizing: the 1-month change is -7.82% and the 3-month change is -10.22%, meaning the recent leg down is steeper than the 6-month trend and momentum is accelerating to the downside. The stock has also underperformed the S&P 500 materially, with relative strength of -2.83% over 1 month, -5.31% over 3 months, and -20.51% over 6 months, indicating this is a company-specific de-rating layered on a soft tape (SPY -4.99% over 1 month). The most recent session fell -3.35% on volume of 683,256 shares, a high-volume breakdown that typically reflects capitulation or fresh negative catalysts rather than benign drift, and there is no visible RSI relief rally despite the oversold positioning.

Key technical levels are now defined by the breakdown: resistance sits at the July high near $148.68 and the prior consolidation shelf around $125-$130, while support is effectively the current price at $110.28 with no established floor beneath it — a breakdown below this level would open air and likely trigger further momentum selling. A reclaim of $125 would be the first sign of a base, and a move back above $130-$135 would be needed to neutralize the downtrend. Volatility is elevated: the -25.83% max drawdown and the sharp July gap from $146.33 to $130.64 (a roughly 11% single-session drop) argue for smaller position sizing, and with the stock at the bottom of its range, risk management should assume beta-like amplification of any further auto-sector weakness.

Beta

—

—

Max Drawdown

-27.0%

Largest decline past year

52-Week Range

—

Price range past year

Annual Return

+0.9%

Cumulative gain past year

PeriodLEA ReturnS&P 500
1m-8.9%-2.3%
3m-13.0%-2.8%
6m-18.1%+2.1%
1y+0.9%+12.3%
ytd-8.3%+10.6%

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LEA Fundamental Analysis

Revenue is growing but only marginally: Q3 2026 revenue of $5.773 billion was up 1.64% year-over-year versus $5.680 billion in Q3 2025, and the multi-quarter trend shows a plateau — Q1 2026 at $5.823 billion, Q2 2026 at $6.209 billion, and Q3 2026 at $5.773 billion, with the sequential decline reflecting normal seasonality but no underlying acceleration. Segment data shows Seating at $4.326 billion and E-Systems at $1.447 billion, so Seating remains the dominant driver at roughly 75% of the total, meaning overall growth is hostage to global light-vehicle production and Lear's ~26% JIT share rather than a fast-growing product line. The 1.6% growth rate is essentially in line with a flat-to-low-single-digit production environment, implying the investment case rests on share gains toward the 29% target and content growth in E-Systems rather than top-line expansion.

Profitability is thin and compressing: Q3 2026 net income was $136.6 million on a net margin of just 2.37%, down from $192.8 million and a 3.10% margin in Q2 2026 and $172.3 million (2.96%) in Q1 2026. Gross margin has deteriorated from 7.59% in Q1 2026 to 7.07% in Q2 to 6.62% in Q3, and operating margin fell from 4.46% to 3.97% to 3.41% over the same span — a clear compression trend that points to pricing pressure, unfavorable mix, or tariff/input cost headwinds. These are structurally low margins even for an auto parts supplier, and the Q3 EBITDA of $212.6 million (3.68% EBITDA margin) versus $397.2 million in Q2 underscores how quickly operating leverage cuts both ways in a low-margin, high-fixed-cost business.

Balance sheet and cash flow are adequate but not fortress-like: debt-to-equity is 0.81, the current ratio is 1.35, and TTM free cash flow is $700.8 million, which against a $6.09 billion market cap implies a healthy FCF yield of roughly 11.5%. ROE of 8.68% is modest, and the quarterly FCF pattern is volatile — $158.4 million in Q3 2026, $287.8 million in Q2, and -$26.5 million in Q1 — reflecting working capital swings typical of a supplier. The company is returning cash aggressively, with $175 million of buybacks and $38 million of dividends in Q3 alone, funded by operating cash flow of $329.3 million against capex of $170.9 million; the dividend yield of 2.70% with a payout ratio of 37.7% looks sustainable, but the leverage and thin margins leave limited cushion if production volumes roll over.

Quarterly Revenue

$5.8B

2026-10

Revenue YoY Growth

+1.6%

YoY Comparison

Gross Margin

6.6%

Latest Quarter

Free Cash Flow

$700800000.0B

Last 12 Months

Revenue & Net Income Trends (2 Years)

Revenue Breakdown

E-Systems Segment
Seating Segment

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Valuation Analysis: Is LEA Overvalued?

Because Lear is profitable (Q3 2026 net income of $136.6 million), the PE ratio is the appropriate primary metric; the trailing PE is 13.94x, while the forward PE field of -1.57x is clearly a data artifact (the same value appears as the PEG ratio) and should be disregarded. The trailing multiple of ~14x on a business with a 2.37% net margin and 8.68% ROE is not demanding in absolute terms, but the market is effectively pricing in earnings erosion — consistent with the stock's 13.9x PE sitting alongside a -21% six-month decline. The PS ratio of 0.26x and EV/EBITDA of 6.64x both suggest the equity is being valued as a low-growth, cyclical supplier rather than a compounder.

Peer comparison is constrained because the provided valuation dataset does not include an explicit industry-average multiple, so a precise premium/discount spread cannot be computed from the data; however, the internal evidence is telling. Lear's 0.26x PS and 6.64x EV/EBITDA are low on an absolute basis for an auto parts supplier, and its 8.23% gross margin and 4.40% operating margin are thin relative to the broader supplier universe, which argues the discount is at least partly justified by inferior profitability. The 1.21x price-to-book and 5.60x price-to-cash-flow reinforce a deep-value framing, but value traps in autos are common when margins are compressing and customer concentration (GM ~22%) is high.

Historically, Lear's own PE band has ranged widely: the historical ratios show PE of 17.80x at Q4 2025, 12.49x at Q3 2025, 7.68x at Q2 2025, and 14.44x at Q4 2024, with the current 13.94x sitting in the middle-to-lower portion of that range rather than at an extreme. The PS ratio of 0.26x, however, is far below the 0.84x-1.08x levels seen through 2025 and the 1.36x-1.64x levels in 2022-2023, indicating the market has repriced the revenue base downward dramatically — a signal of either a genuine value opportunity or, more likely given the margin compression, fundamental deterioration being correctly discounted.

PE

13.9x

Latest Quarter

vs. Historical

Low-End

5-Year PE Range 8x~28x

vs. Industry Avg

13.4x

Industry PE ~13.4x*

EV/EBITDA

6.6x

Enterprise Value Multiple

Investment Risk Disclosure

Financial and operational risks are concentrated in margin fragility and customer dependence. Gross margin of 6.62% and operating margin of 3.41% in Q3 2026 leave almost no buffer, and the sequential EBITDA drop from $397.2 million to $212.6 million shows that a modest revenue decline translates into a disproportionate profit hit. GM at roughly 22% of revenue and GM plus Ford near one-third means a single platform cut is material, while debt-to-equity of 0.81 and a current ratio of 1.35 provide adequate but not fortress-like liquidity; quarterly free cash flow has already swung from -$26.5 million in Q1 to $287.8 million in Q2 to $158.4 million in Q3, so cash generation is volatile and working-capital dependent. Roughly 46% of the 164,300 employees are unionized, adding wage and strike risk to an already thin-margin cost structure.

Market and competitive risks center on multiple compression and cyclical sensitivity. The stock has fallen 21.05% over six months against an S&P 500 decline of only 0.54%, producing -20.51% relative strength, and it now sits at $110.28 — the exact bottom of its 52-week range with no established technical floor beneath it. The 13.94x trailing PE is mid-to-low within its own recent band (7.68x-17.80x), but the 0.26x PS ratio is far below the 0.84x-1.08x levels of 2025 and 1.36x-1.64x of 2022-2023, meaning the market has already repriced the revenue base downward; further compression would require either a production downturn or loss of share to competitors or in-sourcing by OEMs. The JP Morgan downgrade to Neutral on 2026-09-15 and the absence of any Buy rating among five covering analysts suggest sell-side support is thin, and with only five analysts the stock is more vulnerable to momentum-driven moves, as the ~11% single-session gap from $146.33 to $130.64 on 2026-07-31 demonstrated.

Worst-case scenario: North American and European light-vehicle production rolls over, GM cuts a major platform, and Lear concedes price to retain volume, pushing gross margin below 6% and annualized EPS toward the low end of the $27.73 estimate. In that chain, the stock breaks the $110.28 low with no technical support, and the realistic downside anchors to the 52-week low itself and below — a further -10% to -15% from current levels, or roughly -25% cumulative from the July high of $148.68, consistent with the -25.83% max drawdown already recorded over the period. A dividend cut or a leverage-driven downgrade would be the accelerant; at a 37.7% payout ratio that is not the base case, but it becomes plausible if free cash flow turns negative for consecutive quarters as it briefly did in Q1 2026.

FAQ

The most severe risk is margin erosion becoming structural: gross margin has fallen from 7.59% to 7.07% to 6.62% over three quarters and operating margin from 4.46% to 3.41%, and with only a 3.41% operating cushion a modest volume decline produces outsized profit damage, as the EBITDA drop from $397.2 million to $212.6 million shows. Second is customer concentration — GM is roughly 22% of revenue and GM plus Ford about one-third, so a single platform cancellation or North American build-rate cut is material to the top line. Third is cash-flow and balance-sheet volatility: quarterly free cash flow has swung from -$26.5 million in Q1 to $287.8 million in Q2 to $158.4 million in Q3, debt-to-equity is 0.81, and a sustained negative FCF stretch would pressure the 2.70% dividend and the buyback that has been supporting EPS. Fourth is market and sentiment risk: the stock is at $110.28, the exact bottom of its 52-week range, with -20.51% six-month relative strength, a -25.83% max drawdown already recorded, and a unanimous neutral sell-side with no published targets — leaving it vulnerable to momentum selling, as the roughly 11% single-session gap from $146.33 to $130.64 on 2026-07-31 demonstrated. Labor risk from a ~46% unionized workforce of 164,300 adds a further layer.

The base case carries 55% probability with a $118-$132 target range, assuming global light-vehicle production stays flat-to-low-single-digit, gross margin troughs in the 6.5%-6.7% area, and revenue tracks the tightly clustered $27.52 billion analyst average (range $27.02-$27.95 billion) with EPS near $28.41 (range $27.73-$28.98). The bull case at 20% probability targets $148-$160, requiring gross margin to stabilize at or above 6.6%, a seating conquest win moving JIT share toward the 29% target, continued buybacks, and a multiple re-rating from 13.94x toward the 17.80x seen at Q4 2025. The bear case at 25% probability targets $93-$110, driven by a North American production rollover, a GM platform cut, gross margin breaking below 6%, and a break of the $110.28 low with no technical floor beneath it. The base case is most likely because the near-term earnings base is well understood — EPS estimates span only about 4.5% — while the multiple direction remains unresolved; the key assumption is that the margin decline is cyclical rather than structural.

The answer depends on which metric you weight, and that divergence is the heart of the debate. On sales and cash flow the stock looks clearly undervalued: 0.26x PS is far below the 0.84x-1.08x levels seen through 2025 and the 1.36x-1.64x of 2022-2023, and 6.64x EV/EBITDA with a 5.60x price-to-cash-flow and 1.21x book value is deep-value territory for the world's largest seating supplier with 26% just-in-time share. On earnings it is only fairly valued: the 13.94x trailing PE sits mid-to-low within its own recent band of 7.68x (Q2 2025) to 17.80x (Q4 2025), so the multiple itself is not the cushion — the cash flow is. The market is effectively pricing in continued earnings erosion, consistent with a 2.37% net margin and 8.68% ROE, and the forward PE and PEG fields of -1.57x are data artifacts that should be disregarded. Verdict: undervalued on cash flow and sales, fairly valued on earnings — a value stock with a broken trend rather than a mispriced compounder.

The risk/reward is balanced rather than asymmetric, which is why the rating is Hold rather than Buy. On the reward side, the stock at $110.28 trades at 6.64x EV/EBITDA, 0.26x sales and 5.60x price-to-cash-flow, with $700.8 million of TTM free cash flow implying roughly an 11.5% FCF yield, a 2.70% dividend at a 37.7% payout ratio, and a share count down about 7% year-over-year from 53.7 million to 49.9 million. On the risk side, gross margin has fallen three consecutive quarters from 7.59% to 6.62%, Q3 EBITDA collapsed to $212.6 million from $397.2 million, and the stock sits at the literal bottom of its $110.28-$148.68 52-week range with -20.51% six-month relative strength versus the S&P 500. There is also no analyst support to lean on: all five covering firms are Neutral, JP Morgan downgraded from Overweight on 2026-09-15, and no published price targets exist in the dataset to compute upside from. It is a reasonable buy only for value and income investors with a multi-year horizon who accept auto-cycle risk and can tolerate a further 10-15% drawdown; it is not a good buy for momentum or growth-oriented investors until gross margin stabilizes at or above 6.6%.

This is a long-term holding candidate, not a short-term trade. The stock is in a confirmed downtrend — down 21.05% over six months, 10.22% over three months and 7.82% over one month, at the exact bottom of its 52-week range with -20.51% six-month relative strength versus the S&P 500 — so short-term entry offers no momentum support and elevated volatility, evidenced by the -25.83% max drawdown and the ~11% single-session gap on 2026-07-31. The long-term case rests on cash return and valuation: a 2.70% dividend at a 37.7% payout ratio, roughly an 11.5% FCF yield on $700.8 million TTM free cash flow, and a share count reduced about 7% year-over-year that mechanically lifts EPS. Earnings visibility is moderate — five analysts cluster EPS within 4.5% ($27.73-$28.98) — but the auto cycle and customer concentration mean results will remain lumpy. A suggested minimum holding period is 18-24 months, long enough to see whether gross margin stabilizes and whether the deep-value multiple re-rates, with position sizing that assumes a further 10-15% downside toward the bear-case $93-$110 range.